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Peering into the Campaign Finance Law Crystal 
Ball: Guiding Principles for the Future of the 
BCRA and “Issue Advocacy” in Citizens United 
and Beyond* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As though he were predicting, and perhaps inviting, a challenge in 
the near future, Justice Alito wrote just two years ago in FEC v. 
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), that “[i]f it turns out that the 
implementation of the as-applied standard set out in the principal opinion 
impermissibly chills political speech, we will presumably be asked in a 
future case to reconsider the holding in McConnell v. [FEC] that § 203 
[of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)] is facially 
constitutional.”1  Thanks to maneuvering by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, that future case is now at hand and a majority of the 
Justices appear poised to dramatically rewrite campaign finance law as 
the Court reconsiders Citizens United v. FEC.2  Accordingly, this 
Comment develops—using insight from Justices who have emphasized 
First Amendment concerns in campaign finance jurisprudence—guiding 
principles for reaching a healthy democratic balance that fully protects 
pure issue advocacy while regulating sham issue advocacy under the 
BCRA.3 
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 1. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 482–83 (2007) (Alito, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted). 
 2. See Citizens United v. FEC, 129 S. Ct. 2893, 2893 (2009) (mem.) (directing the parties to 
file supplemental briefs addressing whether BCRA § 203 is constitutional on its face and setting oral 
argument for September 9, 2009). 
 3. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in 
scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C.). 
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Campaign finance law has always moved in fits and turns as 
Congress and the courts have tried to balance multiple competing 
interests and values, but since the passage of the BCRA, this area of law 
has changed particularly fast, with even starker disagreement on the 
Court.  As the Court reconsiders Citizens United, it can send the future of 
campaign finance law in a wide array of directions.  Among its many 
options, the Court could reaffirm McConnell’s holding, which upheld the 
facial validity of BCRA § 203, while shoring up the test it developed in 
WRTL II for as-applied challenges.4  Perhaps a better alternative, the 
Court could strike down the BCRA’s primary definition of 
“electioneering communication” as facially unconstitutional and 
implement the fallback definition provided in BCRA § 201.  To avoid 
vagueness concerns, this definition would likely require guiding 
principles with clear criteria for applying the standard in as-applied 
challenges.  Finally, the Court could invalidate BCRA § 203 in its 
entirety, which would raise the question of whether “electioneering 
communication,” as used in the disclosure context of BCRA § 201, also 
violates the U.S. Constitution, either on its face or as applied in certain 
situations. 
Given the great uncertainty in this area of law and the wide array of 
directions in which the Court may go in Citizens United, writing this 
Comment presents both a challenge and a unique opportunity.  By using 
clues from recent Supreme Court cases, this Comment seeks to advance 
campaign finance jurisprudence by developing solid legal premises that 
ensure that individuals, corporations, and unions may engage in political 
and electoral advocacy under a fair set of rules while closing the 
loophole for sham issue advocacy as the BCRA intended. 
Peering into the crystal ball, it appears that the Court will use 
Citizens United to make substantial changes to campaign finance law and 
likely attempt to reconcile McConnell and WRTL II.5  Additionally, while 
                                                     
 4. The WRTL II principal opinion developed a test that met widespread disapproval, even on 
the Court, as seven Justices criticized it.  Many have expressed views that range from a 
characterization of mere incoherence to complete disapproval.  See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Beyond 
Incoherence: The Roberts Court’s Deregulatory Turn in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 92 MINN. 
L. REV. 1064, 1065 (2008) (stating that “as a matter of jurisprudence, the Roberts Court’s new 
approach to campaign finance regulation is just as incoherent as the prior . . . approach, though 
moving in a decidedly different ideological direction”); The Supreme Court, 2006 Term—Leading 
Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 285, 292, 294 (2007) (asserting that “the new test is misguided for several 
reasons” and that “Chief Justice Roberts managed to have his cake and eat it, too”). 
 5. See Adam Cohen, Editorial, A Century-Old Principle: Keep Corporate Money out of 
Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at A16 (suggesting that “[t]he [C]ourt has gone to 
extraordinary lengths to hear the case”); Adam Liptak, Case Could Overhaul Rules on Campaign 
Spending, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2009, at A12 (explaining how the relatively rare action by the Court 
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newly confirmed Justice Sotomayor is largely expected to champion 
deference to congressional acts in this area (like her predecessor Justice 
Souter), most believe that the Court as a whole will continue its recent 
swing to a deregulatory position and invalidate campaign restrictions on 
First Amendment grounds.6  Under these assumptions, it appears the 
question is not whether the Roberts Court will deregulate parts of 
campaign finance law, but rather how far it will go in undoing the BCRA 
and perhaps other existing law.  As this Comment explores, it appears the 
best solution for the Court in Citizens United may be to overrule 
McConnell, strike down the BCRA’s primary definition of electioneering 
communication as used in BCRA § 203, and implement the fallback 
definition provided in BCRA § 201 with a few guiding principles. 
To begin with, it may help to identify a few basic premises on which 
both sides of the debate should agree.  First, pure issue advocacy, as 
distinguished from genuine issue advocacy and issue advocacy 
generally,7 should not be regulated in our democratic form of 
government.  To the extent that “electioneering communication” under 
BCRA § 203 prohibits pure issue advocacy, the Court’s overbreadth 
concerns are justified.  Second, a set of rules must be established under 
which individuals, corporations, and unions can fairly participate in the 
American democracy.  These campaign finance laws must be clear, 
stable, and predictable, as the rule of law requires, and reflect a number 
of competing constitutional values, such as First Amendment freedoms, 
the integrity of the electoral process, and public faith in democracy.8  
Finally, while reasonable persons may disagree about whether Buckley v. 
Valeo’s magic words standard9 regulates too much, not enough, or is 
about right, it is clear that organizations are able to engage in “bad 
sportsmanship” under the test—at least breaking the spirit of the law—by 
eschewing magic words to avoid regulation and airing advertisements 
that advocate for or against a candidate under the guise of issue 
advocacy.  Rule of law and fairness demand, regardless of whether these 
organizations can ultimately engage in this form of electoral advocacy, 
                                                                                                                       
to set the case for reargument, rather than ruling for Citizens United on narrow grounds, suggests 
that the Court is considering a sweeping change to current law). 
 6. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court, Tipped by Kennedy, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, 
at A1 (suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts has helped move Justice Kennedy and the Court to the 
right). 
 7. See infra Part III.C.1.a. 
 8. See Richard Briffault, WRTL II: The Sharpest Turn in Campaign Finance’s Long and 
Winding Road, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 101, 127, 140 (2008) (explaining that campaign finance laws, 
while at times “speech-impairing,” are also “democracy-promoting”). 
 9. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
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that this loophole be closed and replaced with a standard that enables 
organizations to exercise the full extent of their constitutional rights—
whatever they may be—in good faith, rather than under a cloud of deceit. 
Under these premises, this Comment proceeds to explore areas that 
may be helpful in moving forward with Citizens United and future 
campaign finance law.  First, Part II summarizes campaign finance law 
from its earliest beginnings, through Buckley’s magic words, to the 
“electioneering communication” standard of the BCRA.  Next, Part III 
analyzes the two major cases following the enactment of the BCRA, 
which culminate in the current standard for the “functional equivalent of 
express advocacy.”  In doing so, this Comment examines areas in which 
the nine Justices may be able to reach middle ground as the Court 
attempts to reconcile McConnell and WRTL II in Citizens United and 
possibly later cases.  Next, Part III.C.1 distinguishes, in clear and distinct 
terms, the three types of advocacy: pure issue advocacy, express 
candidate advocacy, and the functional equivalent of express advocacy, 
or mixed (so-called issue) advocacy.  With the parameters of advocacy 
clearly defined, Part III.C.2 determines when a so-called issue ad crosses 
the line to become the functional equivalent of express advocacy by 
promoting, attacking, supporting, or opposing a candidate.  Next, Part 
III.C.3 examines where previous tests have gone awry to develop a 
constitutional standard to regulate mixed advocacy while protecting pure 
issue advocacy.  Finally, Part III.C.4 asserts that if the Court overrules 
McConnell and holds BCRA § 203 facially unconstitutional, the broader 
BCRA definition of “electioneering communication” should nevertheless 
continue to be used in the context of requiring increased disclosure under 
BCRA § 201.  Part IV concludes by applying the guiding principles 
developed throughout this Comment to the ads in both WRTL II and 
Citizens United and by peering into the campaign finance law crystal ball 
to analyze how the proposed standard may fare in the future. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Understanding campaign finance law is no easy task; it involves 
constitutional law, federal statutes, and a hodgepodge of Supreme Court 
precedent “marked by fine distinctions, uneasily consistent rulings, and 
cases pointing in different directions.”10  Before reaching the modern 
framework of campaign finance law, this Part examines the historical  
 
                                                     
 10. Briffault, supra note 8, at 140. 
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context by which the current predicament has evolved over the last 
century. 
A. The Beginning: The FECA and Buckley “Balancing Act” to Fight 
Perceived Corruption 
Throughout American history, the ever-evolving moneyed interests 
have invariably found ways to express their speech—contributing to 
political campaigns, in one form or another—perhaps earning the 
widespread perception that big money corrupts the American political 
process.  At its most fundamental level, campaign finance law combats 
political corruption and the appearance thereof; a fight to prevent the 
privileged, wealthy elite from buying access, influence, and perhaps even 
votes, that impair the public good, the less fortunate, and our democratic 
values.  It also reflects a basic struggle to preserve our most sacred rights 
as laid out in the First Amendment: “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the 
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances.”11 
Despite these revered values in our Bill of Rights, they soon grew in 
tension with the American political system.  As early as 1905, President 
Theodore Roosevelt called upon Congress to enact vigorous legislation 
to protect the integrity of federal elections and eradicate perceived 
political corruption; “he found ‘no enemy of free government more 
dangerous and none so insidious.’”12  A battle was set that continues to 
this day: a “clash between the public’s interest in limiting the sources and 
amounts of money spent on elections in order to prevent corruption or 
promote political equality and the burdens that such regulations place on 
First Amendment rights of free speech and association.”13  Stated 
differently, the battle that began in the early twentieth century has 
evolved in stages: preventing corruption, preventing the appearance of 
corruption, and now, preventing the circumvention of measures enacted 
to prevent corruption and the appearance thereof.14 
Responding to President Roosevelt’s call for action, Congress 
enacted the Tillman Act in 1907 and followed with a series of legislation 
                                                     
 11. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 12. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 509 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(quoting President Roosevelt, 39 CONG. REC. 17 (1904)). 
 13. Hasen, supra note 4, at 1067. 
 14. Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Campaign 
Finance Laws—Supreme Court Cases, 19 A.L.R. FED. 2d 1, at § 2 (2007). 
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through the 1960s that limited the disproportionate influence and access 
of deep pockets and special interests on federal elections, regulated the 
spending of federal office campaigns, and mandated public disclosure of 
campaign finances.15  Consolidating its earlier reform efforts, Congress 
enacted the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).16  This 
comprehensive legislation required more stringent and periodic 
disclosures of contributions and expenditures for federal candidates, 
political parties, and political action committees (PACs).17  Additionally, 
later amendments either limited or entirely prohibited contributions by 
individual citizens, political parties, and PACs.18  Finally, FECA 
amendments established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to 
interpret and enforce its provisions.19 
Following FECA’s passage, its regulations were quickly tested in the 
courts.  In Buckley v. Valeo,20 the seminal case in campaign finance law, 
the Supreme Court addressed FECA’s constitutionality and laid the legal 
foundation for constitutional challenges for years to come.  Among the 
new legal distinctions that developed from Buckley, the Court 
differentiated “contributions” from “expenditures.”21  Contributions are 
payments made to or in connection with a federal officeholder, federal 
candidate, or federal election.22  Expenditures, on the other hand, consist 
of payments on behalf of a federal officeholder, federal candidate, or 
federal election, or payments by individuals independently to support or 
oppose federal candidates.23  Under Buckley and its progeny, the 
distinction is crucial: the Court found that limits on expenditures were 
subject to strict scrutiny because they directly infringed upon 
constitutional free speech rights; however, limits on contributions were 
subject only to lesser scrutiny because they merely “marginally” 
restricted First Amendment rights.24  Buckley’s distinction between 
contributions and expenditures grew more important in later years as the 
Court had unintentionally set the ball rolling for a larger battle that 
                                                     
 15. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 509–12 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 16. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified as 
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–57 (2006)). 
 17. Chip Nielsen & Jason D. Kaune, Overview of Federal Campaign Finance: Contribution 
and Expenditure Limitations, in CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 2007: COMPLYING WITH 
CAMPAIGN FINANCE, LOBBYING & ETHICS LAWS 17–18 (2007). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 17. 
 20. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 21. See Nielsen & Kaune, supra note 17, at 17, 21–24, 30–31. 
 22. Id. at 17, 21–24. 
 23. Id. at 17, 30–31. 
 24. Hasen, supra note 4, at 1068. 
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loomed in the near future: express candidate advocacy versus issue 
advocacy. 
B. From Buckley to the BCRA: The Emergence of Magic Words and 
Sham Issue Advocacy 
Since Buckley, the Supreme Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence 
has moved in shifts between deference and deregulation, depending on 
the composition of its membership.25  Rarely moving without a 
substantial number of dissenters, and never formally overturning any of 
its campaign finance precedents, the majorities have either shown 
respectful deference to legislation regulating campaign finances or 
shown hostility to the same legislative efforts on First Amendment 
grounds.26  As will be analyzed later, the Court’s pendulum swung to a 
deregulatory position between McConnell and WRTL II.27 
Notwithstanding the Court’s wavering deference, its reliance on 
distinguishing express candidate advocacy from issue advocacy has 
persisted.  After Buckley, 
[c]andidates and groups spending money on communications that 
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified federal 
candidate would be subject to federal disclosure requirements, but 
individuals and groups engaged in other political advocacy—
subsequently referred to as “issue advocacy”—were not subject to 
disclosure.  Subsequently, the Court applied the express advocacy/issue 
advocacy distinction in determining the scope of the longstanding ban 
on the use of corporate and union treasury funds in federal elections.28 
To address constitutional vagueness concerns, the Buckley Court 
drew a bright line between express advocacy and issue advocacy.  The 
Court ruled that FECA regulations could only restrict express advocacy, 
defined as “communications that in express terms advocate the election 
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”29  Such a narrow requirement 
led to a “magic words” test; express advocacy consisted only of 
communications that used definite words such as “‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ 
‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ 
                                                     
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See infra Part III.B. 
 28. Richard Briffault, WRTL and Randall: The Roberts Court and the Unsettling of Campaign 
Finance Law, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 807, 811 (2007) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 80 (1976); 
FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 249 (1986)) (footnote omitted). 
 29. Hasen, supra note 4, at 1073 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 (1976)). 
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‘defeat,’ [or] ‘reject.’”30  Thus, communications lacking these express 
words, even if intended or likely to influence the outcome of an election, 
were left unregulated by Buckley’s interpretation of FECA.31  Although 
referred to as “issue advocacy,” these communications often focused 
primarily on the issue of electing or defeating a candidate.32  Corporate 
and union funds could be used, with little effort and clever language, to 
avoid FECA requirements and clearly advocate for or against a 
candidate.33 
Within a few election cycles, determined moneyed interests 
exploited this “sham issue advocacy” loophole to preserve access and 
influence.  The following ad, for example, purports to advocate for the 
issue of family values; however, as identified by the Court, it clearly 
advocates for the defeat of candidate Bill Yellowtail: 
Who is Bill Yellowtail?  He preaches family values but took a swing at 
his wife.  And Yellowtail’s response?  He only slapped her.  But “her 
nose was not broken.”  He talks law and order . . . but is himself a 
convicted felon.  And though he talks about protecting children, 
Yellowtail failed to make his own child support payments—then voted 
against child support enforcement.  Call Bill Yellowtail.  Tell him to 
support family values.34 
Sham issue advocacy, such as the Yellowtail ad, boomed in the 
1990s, with spending reaching $150 million in 1996 and more than $500 
million by 2000.35  In an attempt to regulate sham issue advocacy and 
close the loophole left open by Buckley and later cases, Congress 
responded with the BCRA.36 
C. The BCRA: From Magic Words to Electioneering Communications 
Sponsored by Senators John McCain and Russ Feingold, the BCRA 
developed a new “electioneering communication” standard to regulate 
                                                     
 30. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976). 
 31. Hasen, supra note 4, at 1073. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1073–74. 
 34. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 n.78 (2003); James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, 
Distinguishing “Genuine” from “Sham” in Grassroots Lobbying: Protecting the Right to Petition 
During Elections, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 353, 402 (2007). 
 35. Hasen, supra note 4, at 1073–74. 
 36. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in 
scattered sections of 2, 18, 28, 36, and 47 U.S.C.); Hasen, supra note 4, at 1074. 
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sham issue advocacy.37  The BCRA sought to move away from the 
inflexible and ineffective magic words test to more realistically separate 
candidate advocacy from issue advocacy.38  Under the BCRA, regulated 
candidate advocacy now included—in addition to words of express 
advocacy as developed by FECA and Buckley—a broader definition of 
electioneering communication: “any broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication that refers to a candidate for federal office and that is 
aired within 30 days of a federal primary election or 60 days of a federal 
general election in the jurisdiction in which that candidate is running for 
office.”39  Additionally, BCRA § 201 also provided a fallback definition 
if the primary definition was held constitutionally insufficient.40  Under 
BCRA § 203, corporations and unions could not spend general treasury 
funds on electioneering communications, that is, broadcast 
advertisements that advocated or criticized a particular federal candidate 
by name.41  Rather, such activities could only be conducted by a 
segregated fund for political purposes, more commonly known as a 
political action committee (PAC).42  Applying electioneering 
communication in the disclosure context, BCRA § 201 also required 
broader disclosure for ads that were not prohibited under BCRA § 203.43 
Although the new BCRA standard solved the vagueness problem that 
plagued FECA because it could be applied easily without guesswork, it 
presented a different constitutional challenge—overbreadth.44  The 
electioneering communication standard could capture ads that truly 
advocated an issue (despite mentioning a federal candidate by name), 
rather than solely ads that advocated to affect the outcome of an 
election.45  For instance, a corporation or union that wished to promote a 
genuine issue, perhaps intervention in a labor dispute or trade agreement, 
would be prohibited from mentioning federal officeholders during the 
BCRA’s restricted time periods.46 
                                                     
 37. Hasen, supra note 4, at 1074. 
 38. See Jonathan S. Krasno & Frank J. Sorauf, Evaluating the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA), 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 121, 160–61 (2003) (“Whatever its utility might once 
have been, [the magic words test] is now irrelevant to how political ads are designed.”). 
 39. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 457–58 (2007) (citing Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act § 201(f)(3)(A) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A) (2006)).  See also Hasen, 
supra note 4, at 1074; Krasno & Sorauf, supra note 38, at 160–61. 
 40. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 41. Hasen, supra note 4, at 1074–75. 
 42. Id. at 1074. 
 43. See 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 44. Hasen, supra note 4, at 1075. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. 
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Following the enactment of the BCRA, the fight moved to the courts 
as one side argued to uphold the new restrictions, protect the integrity of 
federal elections, and eradicate perceived political corruption.  The other 
side fervently fought the new regulations as encroachments upon First 
Amendment rights.  With the battle scene set, the Court would be called 
upon to crown new victors in McConnell and WRTL II. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In the short existence of the BCRA, the Supreme Court has already 
laid down two monumental cases setting, and resetting, the direction of 
America’s campaign finance law.  In 2003, the McConnell Court upheld 
BCRA § 203, on a five-to-four vote, as constitutional against a facial 
overbreadth challenge.47  Then, after determining in WRTL I that an as-
applied challenge to BCRA § 203 was permissible,48 the WRTL II Court, 
in 2007, developed a controversial new test that, while arguably 
overruling McConnell, certainly reversed the direction of campaign 
finance law.  This Part proceeds to analyze the splintered opinions in 
McConnell and WRTL II in an effort to help improve campaign finance 
jurisprudence as the Court reconsiders Citizens United and future courts 
and Congresses seek to find an effective balance in the field over the 
next century. 
A. McConnell: Leaving the Door Open for Pure Issue Advocacy 
In its first major assessment of the BCRA, the Court in McConnell 
substantially affirmed its constitutionality.49  In rejecting the plaintiffs’ 
argument that BCRA § 203 was unconstitutionally overbroad because its 
definition of electioneering communication allegedly encompassed too 
many genuine issue ads, the Court held that “[t]his argument fails to the 
extent that the issue ads [during the restricted periods] are the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy.”50  The “justifications for the regulation 
of express advocacy apply equally [to the issue ads] during those periods 
if the ads are intended to influence the voters’ decisions and have that 
effect.”51  While the precise percentage of issue ads that had an 
                                                     
 47. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 207 (2003). 
 48. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC (WRTL I), 546 U.S. 410, 411–12 (2006). 
 49. Scot J. Zentner, Revisiting McConnell: Campaign Finance and the Problem of Democracy, 
23 J.L. & POL. 475, 475 (2007). 
 50. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206. 
 51. Id. 
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electioneering purpose was in dispute, “the vast majority of ads clearly 
had such a purpose.”52  The majority correctly stated that “future 
corporations and unions may finance genuine issue ads during [the 
restricted] timeframes by simply avoiding any specific reference to 
federal candidates, or in doubtful cases by paying for the ad from a 
segregated fund.”53  These alternatives, while reasonable, nevertheless 
raise overbreadth concerns, even if the vast majority of ads should be 
regulated. 
In language that proved crucial in WRTL II, the McConnell majority 
“assume[d] that the interests that justify the regulation of campaign 
speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine issue ads.”54  These 
interests, of “the highest importance,” included preserving the individual 
citizen’s confidence in government, “preserving the integrity of the 
electoral process, preventing corruption, and sustaining the active, alert 
responsibility of the individual citizen in a democracy for the wise 
conduct of the government.”55 
Although the BCRA passed the facial constitutional challenge in 
McConnell, it remained unclear whether BCRA § 203 could be subjected 
to an as-applied challenge by a corporation or union in specific 
instances.56  The answer soon came as Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 
pushed the question by financing a so-called issue ad—one that 
mentioned a prohibited federal candidate—from its general treasury 
during the restricted period.57 
B. WRTL II: The Only “Majority” Opinion: “We Effectively Overruled 
McConnell” 
Before analyzing the splintered opinions in WRTL II, two important 
points should be made.  First, the Court moved drastically from a 
deferential position (deferring to regulatory acts of Congress) to a 
deregulatory position (emphasizing First Amendment rights over the 
various interests that arguably justify campaign finance regulations).58  
The swing, however, was not so much a change in ideology as a change 
                                                     
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 206 n.88. 
 55. Id. (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 788–89 (1978)). 
 56. Hasen, supra note 4, at 1076. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1064–65. 
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in the Court’s membership.59  In the four years between McConnell and 
WRTL II, the seats of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor were 
filled by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito.60  The importance of 
this change cannot be overstated because the two newest members not 
only played a crucial role in reversing the direction of the Court’s 
campaign finance jurisprudence in WRTL II, but they may also be the 
deciding votes in Citizens United. 
Second, the Court’s general tone toward campaign finance law also 
changed dramatically in WRTL II.  McConnell was “full of language 
about legislative deference, flexibility, political reality, and the need to 
give Congress the room to address campaign finance problems step-by-
step.”61  It also traced congressional efforts to limit wealthy interests, 
noted the virtual ease of evading campaign finance laws, and minimized 
First Amendment concerns.62  The tone in WRTL II just four years later, 
on the other hand, runs to “the polar opposite of McConnell.”63  Rather 
than speaking of PAC alternatives, congressional deference, or FECA 
loopholes, WRTL II assessed the BCRA in terms of a free speech “ban” 
or “blackout,” censorship, and First Amendment rights.64  This turn to 
deregulation is expected to continue in Citizens United.65  With a basic 
understanding of the Court’s changed membership and attitude following 
the McConnell decision, this Comment now analyzes each of the four 
opinions in WRTL II. 
1. The Principal Opinion: Redefining the “Functional Equivalent of 
Express Advocacy” 
While reflecting valid overbreadth concerns, the WRTL II principal 
opinion developed a test that met widespread disapproval on both sides 
of the issue and received the endorsement of only two Justices.66  Chief 
Justice Roberts began by examining the holding in McConnell, briefly 
noting the difference between campaign speech and “speech about public 
issues more generally” that mentions a federal candidate or 
officeholder.67  Critical to WRTL II’s holding, he seized the language 
                                                     
 59. See id. 
 60. Id. at 1065. 
 61. Id. at 1086. 
 62. For a more detailed explanation of McConnell’s tone, see id. at 1086–87. 
 63. Id. at 1087. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 66. See sources cited supra note 4. 
 67. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 456 (2007). 
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used in a footnote from McConnell’s majority opinion: “the Court 
‘assumed’ that the interests it had found to ‘justify the regulation of 
campaign speech might not apply to the regulation of genuine issue 
ads.’”68  It is worth pointing out, however, that the Court left the door 
open for genuine or pure issue ads, not the broader category of issue ads 
generally.69  This distinction is not consistently used in the Chief 
Justice’s analysis: “the interests held to justify restricting corporate 
campaign speech or its functional equivalent do not justify restricting 
issue advocacy . . . .”70  The omission of “genuine” can hardly go 
unnoticed;71 whether intentional or not, it drastically changes the result, 
for issue advocacy generally is comprised of two types: pure issue 
advocacy and mixed (so-called issue) advocacy.  While McConnell left 
the door open for the former, it clearly upheld regulations on the latter.72  
WRTL II’s holding eliminated overbreadth concerns but presented 
vagueness issues and reopened the door for sham issue ads.73 
The Chief Justice proceeded to reject the contention that McConnell 
had “already established the constitutional test for determining if an ad is 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy: whether the ad is intended 
to influence elections and has that effect.”74  Next, he developed his own 
test: “a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable 
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate.”75  The test is similar to the fallback definition of 
“electioneering communication” provided in BCRA § 201.76  According 
to the Chief Justice’s reasoning, ads that do not meet the definition of the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy in the test above fall outside 
the scope of McConnell’s holding.77  Therefore, taking it a step further,  
 
                                                     
 68. Id. (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 206 n.88 (2003)). 
 69. Although often used interchangeably, the differences between issue advocacy generally, 
genuine issue advocacy, and pure issue advocacy are analyzed infra at Part III.C.1. 
 70. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 457. 
 71. The principal opinion surely recognizes the distinction, for it uses the term “genuine issue 
advocacy,” rather than merely “issue advocacy,” where it supports its contentions.  See, e.g., id. at 
470 (“Under [the WRTL II] test, WRTL’s three ads are plainly not the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy.  First, their content is consistent with that of a genuine issue ad . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
 72. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 205, 206 n.88 (2003). 
 73. See WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 457. 
 74. Id. at 465. 
 75. Id. at 469–70. 
 76. See infra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 77. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 476. 
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he reasoned that issue ads fall outside the scope of McConnell’s holding 
and cannot be prohibited under BCRA § 203.78 
Finally, the Chief Justice held that BCRA § 203 was unconstitutional 
as applied to WRTL’s ads because “[the ads were] not express advocacy 
or its functional equivalent, and because appellants identif[ied] no 
interest sufficiently compelling to justify burdening WRTL’s 
speech . . . .”79  Among the justifications used by the Chief Justice, he 
cited the “liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public 
concern,”80 which necessitates an objective test that focuses on “the 
substance of the communication rather than amorphous considerations of 
intent and effect.”81 
In summary, the principal opinion reflects valid concerns that the 
standard under BCRA § 203 could capture and prohibit pure issue 
advocacy.  While pure issue advocacy can undoubtedly occur without 
mentioning a federal candidate, it is equally true that mentioning such a 
candidate does not automatically convert an otherwise pure issue ad into 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy, which the BCRA 
executed and McConnell approved.  To the extent the principal opinion 
addressed these concerns, it should be commended.  Nevertheless, to the 
much larger extent it permits a corporation to escape BCRA regulation 
merely because it can create an ad which contains a “reasonable” 
interpretation as something “other than [] an appeal to vote for or against 
a specific candidate,”82 it should not be followed in Citizens United or 
later cases.  The key is not whether an ad genuinely advocates for or 
against an issue, but rather, whether it reasonably can be interpreted as 
engaging—explicitly or implicitly—in any candidate advocacy.  Thus, 
whereas an ad that genuinely advocates an issue and mentions a 
candidate should not necessarily be regulated, an ad that promotes or 
attacks a candidate, while perhaps also engaging in genuine issue 
advocacy, should always be regulated.  For lack of a better term, it is the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy, which will be explored 
further in Part III.C. 
                                                     
 78. Id. at 476–79. 
 79. Id. at 481. 
 80. Id. at 469 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 470. 
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2. Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion: If Necessary, Reconsider 
McConnell Later 
Justice Alito, the only other Justice to endorse the principal opinion’s 
new test, wrote briefly in a concurring opinion apparently to explain his 
reluctance for not joining Justice Scalia’s position that McConnell should 
be overruled and BCRA § 203 declared facially unconstitutional.83  
Rather than acknowledging that the principal opinion effectively 
overruled McConnell, as seven other Justices had done, Justice Alito 
took the middle ground, explaining that it was unnecessary to reconsider 
whether BCRA § 203 was facially unconstitutional because the as-
applied challenge resolved the issues in WRTL II.84  Justice Alito 
subscribed to the principal opinion’s belief that WRTL II merely resolved 
a gap left open by McConnell.85  As mentioned in Part I, the predictive 
language used by Justice Alito seems to illustrate even his doubts about 
the viability of the new test to which he subscribed, and possibly his 
openness to striking down BCRA § 203 in Citizens United.86 
3. Building a Plurality Despite the Flawed Test: Overrule McConnell 
On the deregulatory side of the battle, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and 
Thomas would have overruled the portion of McConnell that held BCRA 
§ 203 facially constitutional, thus negating the existence of as-applied 
challenges.87  Yet, the principal opinion was not ready to go that far and 
the Court was forced to articulate “the standard for prevailing in an as-
applied challenge to BCRA § 203.”88  Distancing his opinion from the 
Chief Justice’s new test, Justice Scalia explained that no test “can both 
(1) comport with the requirement of clarity that unchilled freedom of 
political speech demands, and (2) be compatible with the facial validity 
of § 203 (as pronounced in McConnell).”89  Rather, he wrote that any 
test, whether the principal opinion’s test, the district court’s five-part 
test,90 or otherwise, “is impermissibly vague and thus ineffective to 
vindicate the fundamental First Amendment rights of the large segment 
                                                     
 83. See id. at 482 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 482–83. 
 87. Id. at 499–500 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 88. Id. at 491. 
 89. Id. at 483–84. 
 90. See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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of society to which [BCRA] § 203 applies.”91  Moreover, he explained 
that any such test sets the Court upon “the unsavory task of separating 
issue-speech from election-speech with no clear criterion.”92  In Justice 
Scalia’s belief, “[i]f a permissible test short of the magic-words test 
existed, Buckley would surely have adopted it.”93 
Yet, when Buckley was decided, it could not contemplate the 
explosion of sham issue advocacy leading up to the enactment of the 
BCRA.  When the Court differentiated between express advocacy94 and 
the “narrow” exclusion of issue advocacy,95 it could not anticipate the 
colossal loophole that would develop and essentially remove any teeth 
from FECA regulations.  Indeed, the Court would not realize the need to 
distinguish issue advocacy, as it defined it, from “genuine” or “pure” 
issue advocacy until years later.  The Buckley Court did recognize, 
however, the need to prevent corruption and the appearance thereof, 
referring to “the ‘quid pro quo’ variety.”96 
Despite concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia clearly took issue 
with the principal opinion’s new test.97  Noting that the principal 
opinion’s new test goes so far as to arguably protect even the most 
striking example of sham issue advocacy in the McConnell record,98 
Justice Scalia gave a scathing review of the principal opinion’s test and 
its proclaimed compatibility with McConnell: 
[T]he principal opinion’s attempt at distinguishing McConnell is 
unpersuasive enough, and the change in the law it works is substantial 
enough, that seven Justices of this Court, having widely divergent 
views concerning the constitutionality of the restrictions at issue, agree 
that the opinion effectively overrules McConnell without saying so.  
This faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.99 
                                                     
 91. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 492 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 92. Id. at 484. 
 93. Id. at 495. 
 94. “[A]dvertising that ‘in express terms advocates the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate for federal office’ by use of such words of advocacy ‘as vote for, elect, support, . . . .’”  Id. 
at 486–87 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976)). 
 95. “[A]n ad that refers to a clearly identified candidate’s position on an issue, but does not 
expressly advocate his election or defeat.”  Id. at 487. 
 96. Id. at 486 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27, 45, 47 (1976)). 
 97. See, e.g., id. at 496 (“Though the principal opinion purports to recognize the ‘imperative for 
clarity’ in this area of First Amendment law, its attempt to distinguish its test from the test found to 
be vague in Buckley falls far short.”); id. at 499 n.6 (“The principal opinion claims that its test is no 
more vague than WRTL’s test.  I disagree.”  (citation omitted)). 
 98. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (examining the Yellowtail ad). 
 99. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 499 n.7 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(citations omitted). 
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Recognizing that any clever advocate could evade the regulations under 
FECA and Buckley’s express advocacy standard, Justice Scalia 
nevertheless suggested that perhaps only two solutions consistent with 
the First Amendment exist: either restrictions on independent 
expenditures must be eliminated altogether or the restrictions must return 
to the traditional magic words standard of Buckley.100 
Looking ahead to Citizens United, it is likely that Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas will continue to assert that BCRA § 203, when 
using the primary definition of electioneering communication, is facially 
unconstitutional.  However, they recognized the distinction between 
issue ads generally and “genuine” or “pure” issue ads.101  Thus, if clear 
criteria can be developed to separate “issue-speech” (pure issue 
advocacy) from “election-speech” (mixed advocacy), it is conceivable 
that these Justices may find more restrictive regulation constitutionally 
acceptable without the need to return to Buckley’s magic words 
standard.102  Part III.C.3 explores a standard that may have sufficiently 
clear criteria. 
4. Justice Souter and the Dissent: WRTL II Stands McConnell on Its 
Head 
Championing the position of legislative deference to congressional 
efforts to eradicate political corruption and the appearance thereof, and 
perhaps stare decisis to a lesser extent, the dissent, a vote short from its 
majority position in McConnell, maintained its tone and position as 
developed in that case.  Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, explained the dissent’s position in three points: 
[(1)] the demand for campaign money in huge amounts from large 
contributors, whose power has produced a cynical electorate; [(2)] the 
congressional recognition of the ensuing threat to democratic integrity 
as reflected in a century of legislation restricting the electoral leverage 
of concentrations of money in corporate and union treasuries; and [(3)] 
McConnell [], declaring the facial validity of the most recent Act of 
Congress in that tradition, a decision that is effectively, and 
unjustifiably, overruled today.103 
                                                     
 100. Id. at 499. 
 101. See id. at 485. 
 102. See id. at 483–84. 
 103. Id. at 504 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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Devoting significant attention to the explosive growth and dangerous 
side effects of money spent on advertising, particularly for media time 
and space, the dissent recognized the need to implement the will of the 
people, as effected through congressional passage of the BCRA.104 
Recognizing the distinction between issue advocacy generally and 
“genuine” or “pure” issue advocacy, the dissent echoed many of the 
sentiments expressed by Justice Scalia—a rare agreement between the 
two polar opposites—in its attack on the principal opinion.  The dissent 
first described issue advocacy in its general usage as “an advertisement 
on a political subject urging the reader or listener to let a politician know 
what he thinks, but containing no magic words telling the recipient to 
vote for or against anyone.”105  General usage of the term “issue 
advocacy” thus encompasses both sham issue ads and genuine issue ads, 
reflecting the simple magic words dividing line developed in Buckley.106 
Seizing on the principal opinion’s apparent disregard for the 
distinction between issue advocacy generally and its (much) smaller 
subpart of pure issue advocacy, the dissent explained the effective 
overruling of McConnell and, perhaps, even Buckley: 
 The principal opinion . . . simply inverts what we said in 
McConnell.  While we left open the possibility of a “genuine” or “pure” 
issue ad that might not be open to regulation under [BCRA] § 203, we 
meant that an issue ad without campaign advocacy could escape the 
restriction.  The implication of the adjectives “genuine” and “pure” is 
unmistakable: if an ad is reasonably understood as going beyond a 
discussion of issues (that is, if it can be understood as electoral 
advocacy), then by definition it is not “genuine” or “pure.”  But the 
principal opinion inexplicably wrings the opposite conclusion from 
those words: if an ad is susceptible to any “reasonable interpretation 
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate,” then 
it must be a “pure” or “genuine” issue ad.  This stands McConnell on its 
head, and on this reasoning it is possible that even some ads with magic 
words could not be regulated.107 
Under the principal opinion’s test, the campaigning process is likely to 
revert back to the two tiers that the BCRA and McConnell sought to 
change: (1) a “tightly regulated and controlled” tier of candidates and 
political parties; and (2) a tier of interest groups that operate “under the  
 
                                                     
 104. See id. at 504–07. 
 105. Id. at 515. 
 106. See id. at 515–16. 
 107. Id. at 526–27 (citations omitted). 
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guise of ‘issue advocacy,’” but quite clearly focus on election activities, 
which lie beyond accountability.108 
With the retirement of Justice Souter, the number of Justices 
virtually certain to continue this line of reasoning and support regulation 
in Citizens United is reduced to three.  It is likely, however, that Justice 
Sotomayor will join this camp.109  With this contextual setting in place, 
this Comment proceeds to analyze areas of campaign finance law that 
should be considered in Citizens United and later cases. 
C. Citizens United and the Future of Campaign Finance Law 
No reasonable person should dispute that pure issue advocacy, as 
defined below, should be free from regulation.  Likewise, it is clear that 
the magic words standard of Buckley permits electoral advocacy to 
escape regulation under the guise of issue advocacy.  Disagreement 
manifests over the extent to which regulation should exist regarding ads 
that contain both candidate advocacy and issue advocacy, and whether 
either type exists in a particular ad in the first place.  Nevertheless, all 
should also agree that individuals, corporations, and unions should play 
by a fair set of rules in campaign finance.  The problem arises in 
determining what is “fair” when balancing competing interests of 
“freedom of speech and association, political equality, electoral 
competitiveness, and controlling the undue influence of money on the 
political process.”110  To help develop a fair set of rules, this section 
clearly defines the bounds of advocacy below. 
1. Building Blocks: Defining Pure, Express, and Mixed (So-Called 
Issue) Advocacy 
It has been argued that “Buckley drew a constitutionally mandated 
line between express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy, and that 
speakers possess an inviolable First Amendment right to engage in the 
latter category of speech.”111  However, the Court rejected such a 
contention, explaining that Buckley’s “express advocacy limitation, in 
both the expenditure and the disclosure contexts, was the product of 
statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional command.”112  The 
                                                     
 108. Id. at 518 n.10. 
 109. See Liptak, supra note 6. 
 110. Briffault, supra note 8, at 140. 
 111. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 190 (2003). 
 112. Id. at 191–92. 
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Court found that express advocacy and so-called issue advocacy were 
“functionally identical in important respects” and that “the presence or 
absence of magic words cannot meaningfully distinguish electioneering 
speech from a true issue ad.”113  Moreover, the Court has held that 
corporate candidate advocacy—both express advocacy and the functional 
equivalent—can be regulated.114  Thus, deciphering the various types of 
advocacy becomes crucial because a statute that is “neither vague nor 
overbroad” can constitutionally regulate so-called issue advocacy.115  
Advocacy can be fairly divided into three categories: (1) pure issue 
advocacy; (2) express candidate advocacy; and (3) the functional 
equivalent of express advocacy, or mixed (so-called issue) advocacy, 
which is comprised of both sham issue ads and genuine issue ads that 
also advocate for or against a candidate.116 
a. Pure Issue Advocacy 
McConnell left open the possibility that “genuine” or “pure” issue 
ads may escape the regulation of BCRA § 203.117  WRTL II, with its test, 
sought to remove any doubt, excluding issue advocacy from its definition 
of the functional equivalent of express advocacy, thereby protecting 
genuine issue advocacy—and probably sham issue advocacy—from 
regulation.  Although the terms “genuine” and “pure” are often used 
interchangeably, they are not one and the same, and the difference is 
significant in successfully regulating campaign finance ads. 
Before analyzing this distinction, it is helpful to define “issue 
advocacy” generally.  An “issue” is “a point, matter, or dispute, the 
decision of which is of special or public importance.”118  Thus, an issue 
can be either electoral (candidate oriented), such as a candidate’s 
qualifications or voting record, or political (issue oriented), such as taxes, 
health care, or abortion.119  “Advocacy” is “the act of pleading for, 
                                                     
 113. Id. at 126, 193. 
 114. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 481 (2007) (citing Austin v. Mich. 
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990) (upholding regulation of corporate campaign 
speech); McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206 (upholding regulation of the functional equivalent of corporate 
campaign speech)). 
 115. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 192. 
 116. See also Krasno & Sorauf, supra note 38, at 154 (separating advocacy communications into 
three types: candidate ads, candidate-oriented issue ads, and pure issue ads). 
 117. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206 n.88. 
 118. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1015 (2d ed. 1993). 
 119. This Comment recognizes that the term “issue” also encompasses matters outside electoral 
or political issues, such as selecting a new chancellor for my beloved alma mater, but this is 
irrelevant to campaign finance law. 
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supporting, or recommending; active espousal.”120  Thus, “issue 
advocacy” broadly encompasses the acts of pleading for or against any of 
the issues identified above, both electoral and political.  Consequently, 
the terms “issue advocacy” and “so-called issue advocacy” do not 
meaningfully separate electoral advocacy from political advocacy, which 
is imperative to develop a standard that comports with the different 
constitutional commands for each type as interpreted by the Court in 
Buckley and later cases.  For the purposes of clarity and to comport with 
popular usage, this Comment will use the term “issue” to refer to 
political issues only and will not consider electoral matters (that promote, 
attack, support, or oppose a candidate) to be “issues.” 
In campaign finance jurisprudence, “genuine issue advocacy” is 
generally used to refer to ads that focus on issues other than electoral 
issues and refrain from discreetly attacking or promoting a candidate.  
This general usage, however, is not necessarily accurate.  “Genuine” is 
defined to mean: “(Of a thing) authentic or real; something that has the 
quality of what it is purported to be or to have.”121  Thus, genuine issue 
advocacy encompasses any ad that authentically pleads for or against an 
issue.  It is possible that an organization may want to genuinely advocate 
for both an issue and a candidate in the same message.  While this ad is 
certainly genuine and labeling this ad a sham would be inaccurate, the ad 
should nevertheless be regulated because it engages in electoral 
advocacy.  This ad is perhaps better termed mixed advocacy, or the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy, because it engages in both 
genuine candidate advocacy and genuine issue advocacy. 
Thus, while genuine issue ads should sometimes be regulated, there 
is a category of ads that should never be regulated: pure issue advocacy, 
or perhaps more accurately, pure, genuine issue advocacy.  “Pure” is 
defined as “free from anything of a different, inferior, or contaminating 
kind; free from extraneous matter[;] . . . being that and nothing else.”122  
Hence, pure issue advocacy is the act of pleading for a point or matter of 
public importance, focusing only on that particular point or matter and 
nothing else.  Thus, if an ad leaves the reasonable bounds of advocating 
that particular issue, or includes other information of a different or 
contaminating kind, it is no longer pure issue advocacy.  Under this 
definition, a pure issue ad is not necessarily prohibited from mentioning  
 
                                                     
 120. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 30 (2d ed. 1993). 
 121. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 708 (8th ed. 2004). 
 122. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1569 (2d ed. 1993). 
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a federal candidate or officeholder, which is why BCRA § 203, as 
examined under McConnell, was problematic. 
Chief Justice Roberts provides further guidance into the essential 
attributes of genuine issue advocacy: “[It] conveys information and 
educates.  An issue ad’s impact on an election, if it exists at all, will 
come only after the voters hear the information and choose—uninvited 
by the ad—to factor it into their voting decisions.”123  Thus, under Chief 
Justice Roberts’s analysis of issue advocacy, there is no reason to shield 
ads that contain any degree of candidate advocacy, explicitly or 
implicitly, because they go beyond providing information and educating, 
and necessarily invite voters “to factor it into their voting decisions.”124  
This conclusion is consistent with McConnell and compatible with 
Buckley and the Constitution: pure issue advocacy is never regulated and 
ads with any candidate advocacy, whether express or not, are always 
regulated.  Thus, the key is developing a standard to determine when an 
ad engages in candidate advocacy. 
b. Express Candidate Advocacy 
Under virtually all standards, the Court has upheld the regulation of 
express candidate advocacy.  To avoid a chilling effect on free speech, 
the Court largely explained this definition to mean “communications 
containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote 
for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote 
against,’ ‘defeat,’ [or] ‘reject.’”125  However, the term is not necessarily 
so restricted.  “Express” means “clearly indicated; distinctly stated; 
definite; explicit; plain.”126  A “candidate” is “a person who seeks an 
office.”127  Thus, express candidate advocacy refers to the act of 
supporting or opposing, in a clear and distinct manner, a person for 
office.  Although express candidate advocacy may use issue advocacy—
the act of supporting a point or matter of public importance—to enhance 
its express candidate advocacy, the primary goal of the ad is to promote 
or attack a candidate. 
It is not necessary to use the magic words, or even words at all, to 
engage in express candidate advocacy.  Indeed, visual images, charts, 
graphs, or music can accomplish this goal.  For instance, an ad featuring 
                                                     
 123. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 470 (2007). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44 n.52 (1976). 
 126. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 683 (2d ed. 1993). 
 127. Id. at 304. 
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a photo of a candidate with a large “X” drawn over it could hardly be 
defended as anything other than express candidate advocacy.  Ads that 
seek to avoid regulation under the guise of issue advocacy would likely 
avoid these extreme measures, so exploring this category further is 
unnecessary. 
c. The Functional Equivalent of Express Advocacy: Mixed (So-Called 
Issue) Advocacy 
While it is tempting to label this category sham issue advocacy, and 
although all ads in this category should face regulation, it is more 
accurately labeled mixed advocacy with two subparts.  One subpart, as 
explored earlier, is comprised of ads that genuinely advocate for or 
against both an issue and a candidate.128  The second subpart, which is 
more common, involves a corporation that seeks to use issue advocacy as 
a guise to avoid regulation while engaging in candidate advocacy, hence, 
a sham.  Sham ads purport to focus on issues and avoid the use of clearly 
prohibited magic words, yet promote, attack, support, or oppose a 
candidate.  Often, this area of advocacy is termed simply “issue 
advocacy.”  Reflecting the unclear nature of this area, the line between 
issue advocacy and candidate advocacy has been described as “a line in 
the sand drawn on a windy day. . . .  It is foolish to believe there is any 
practical difference between issue advocacy and advocacy of a political 
candidate.”129  Notwithstanding this assertion, there are meaningful 
differences and a standard can be developed such that the distinction 
does not “dissolve in practical application.”130 
The Court has upheld the regulation of the “functional equivalent of 
express advocacy.”131  “Functional” is defined as: “of or pertaining to a 
function or functions; having or serving a utilitarian purpose; capable of 
serving the purpose for which it was designed.”132  “Equivalent” means 
“equal in value, measure, force, effect, significance, etc.”133  Hence, the 
“functional equivalent of express advocacy” can be stated as the act of 
supporting or opposing a person for office, not in clear and distinct  
 
                                                     
 128. See supra Part III.C.1.a. 
 129. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 128 n.16 (2003) (citation omitted). 
 130. See id. at 327 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with 
respect to BCRA Titles I and II). 
 131. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 482 (2007) (citing McConnell, 
440 U.S. at 206). 
 132. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 775 (2d ed. 1993). 
 133. Id. at 657. 
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terms, but with any message that serves that purpose with roughly equal 
effect or force. 
Notwithstanding the difficulty of separating issue advocacy from 
candidate advocacy, this Comment asserts that (1) a court can reasonably 
determine when these ads purely advocate for or against an issue or 
issues without promoting, attacking, supporting, or opposing a candidate; 
and, consequently, (2) ads that do not purely advocate an issue or issues 
should be interpreted as the functional equivalent of express advocacy 
and regulated.  “Unusually important interests” justify the regulation of 
corporate campaign-related speech.134  These interests justify the 
regulation of any corporate speech that occurs outside of a PAC and goes 
beyond pure issue advocacy as defined herein because all ads that cannot 
be distinguished as pure issue advocacy necessarily involve some degree 
of candidate advocacy by promoting, attacking, supporting, or opposing 
a candidate.  Pure issue advocacy is the only type of advocacy that 
avoids the corrupting potential of candidate advocacy in all its forms.  
Moreover, pure issue advocacy retains its full force and effect without a 
mere hint toward any candidate other than for contact purposes, and 
these appeals to the human consciousness often gain more 
persuasiveness or sympathy by omitting any reference to a candidate or 
election.  After determining that only pure issue advocacy should be free 
from regulation, the trick becomes drawing a line—that does not 
“dissolve in practical application”135—to determine when an ad becomes 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy by promoting, attacking, 
supporting, or opposing a candidate. 
2. When Does an Ad Promote, Attack, Support, or Oppose a 
Candidate? 
In WRTL II, Justice Scalia used a Moroccan cartoonist to draw an 
analogy to American campaign finance law: 
A Moroccan cartoonist once defended his criticism of the Moroccan 
monarch [which was a serious crime] as follows: “I’m not a 
revolutionary, I’m just defending freedom of speech . . . .  I never said  
 
                                                     
 134. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 206 n.88 (citing First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 
765, 788–89 (1978)). 
 135. See id. at 327 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part with 
respect to BCRA Titles I and II). 
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we had to change the king—no, no, no, no!  But I said that some things 
the king is doing, I do not like.  Is that a crime?”136 
Accounting for the fact that the United States has elected 
representatives rather than a king, Justice Scalia answered that BCRA 
§ 203 makes it a crime if the speaker is a union or corporation and the 
representative is identified by name within a restricted period.137  Justice 
Scalia then used the analogy to explain that McConnell left open the 
possibility that the BCRA prohibition may be unconstitutional if the ad 
criticized “only the king’s policies and not his tenure in office.”138  Thus, 
the essential question: “Does attacking the king’s position attack the 
king?”139 
If a corporation seeks to attack a policy (perhaps of the king), and 
not necessarily the king, then it does not matter if the king supports the 
policy for the purpose of attacking the policy.  If a corporation truly 
attacks a policy on the merits of the policy, it is unnecessary to indicate 
or allude to the king’s position on the policy.  If listeners are moved by 
the merits of the policy, it may naturally lead them to inquire about the 
king’s position or plead with the king to change his position (if they 
already knew it or once they learn it).  Accordingly, the corporation 
should be permitted to tell the listeners who their king is and how he can 
be contacted.  The corporation could even provide a link for the listener 
that provides more information about the policy or begins to explain that 
the policy belongs to the king.  But if in the initial announcement, the 
corporation must allude to the fact that the policy actually belongs to the 
king, then it is not the policy or its merits that are under attack, but the 
king himself.  The discussion moves from changing the policy to 
changing the king in order to get a different policy.  The merits of the 
policy get contaminated with personal attributes of the king.  To 
accomplish this mixed discussion in an initial announcement, the 
corporation should be forced to use a PAC, because whether it intends to 
or not, the corporation effectively attacks the king. 
Therefore, in response to Justice Scalia’s question—“[d]oes 
attacking the king’s [policy] attack the king?”140—the answer is yes, if 
the announcement alludes to the fact that the policy belongs to the king 
                                                     
 136. WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 483 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(citation omitted). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 493. 
 140. Id. 
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(without first attacking the merits of the policy on the merits alone).  
Now, certainly some listeners will already know the policy belongs to the 
king (as certainly as many will not), but this does not affect the analysis.  
The intent of the speaker is irrelevant, and the effect on the listener of 
alluding to the candidate’s position or other qualities will always be to 
infuse a discussion on the merits of a policy with contaminating 
candidate discussion, which necessarily leads to promoting or attacking a 
candidate. 
Thus, to draw from the analogy, by replacing “policy” with “issue,” 
“king” with “named candidate or officeholder,” and “announcement” 
with “broadcast advertisement,” this Comment asserts that a standard can 
be developed which permits a corporation to attack a candidate’s position 
on an issue without attributing the underlying position to the candidate, 
and thus without attacking the candidate.  This analogy provides an 
effective solution for distinguishing when and how it is appropriate to 
mention a candidate or officeholder in an ad from when and how an ad 
crosses the line into the functional equivalent of express advocacy by 
effectively engaging in both candidate and issue advocacy. 
To help summarize the analogy, a court should look to clear criteria 
to determine whether an ad promotes, attacks, supports, or opposes a 
candidate.  Pure issue advocacy promotes or attacks a policy itself; thus, 
an unregulated ad should not attack a candidate by discussing his 
personal characteristics nor attribute the policy under attack to the 
candidate.  It should focus purely on the merits of the issue.  The ad 
could recommend contacting the representative and encouraging him to 
take action on the policy, but it cannot hint at the actual position of the 
candidate or his attributes, which would contaminate the ad.  To apply 
the reasoning of Chief Justice Roberts, the ad would no longer only 
inform and educate, but also impermissibly invite voters to factor it into 
their voting decisions.141  If a viewer of the ad is persuasively moved by 
the merits of the issue, it should naturally lead him to inquire into the 
position of a candidate or take other action, which is not only acceptable, 
but one of the underlying goals of pure issue advocacy.  Such inquiry 
promotes the “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” discussion of public 
issues vital to our democracy.142  But the pure issue ad should not suggest 
or allude to the position of the candidate or his personal attributes in any 
manner. 
                                                     
 141. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text. 
 142. See WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 467 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976)). 
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While it should be relatively easy to determine when an ad mentions 
a candidate for any purpose other than to identify him for viewers and 
provide his contact information, several actions by an ad should qualify 
as alluding to the candidate’s position or personal attributes.  In addition 
to referring directly to a candidate’s position, a reference to his prior 
positions or votes would immediately disqualify the ad as pure issue 
advocacy.  Although perhaps more disguised, an ad would also cross the 
line by identifying a group (perhaps a political party, other candidates, 
family, friends, contributors, or supporters) and insinuating that the 
candidate shares the same beliefs as the group.  Additionally, an ad 
would not be pure if it identified other issues in which the candidate had 
been involved and attempted to attribute some connection to the issue at 
hand.  Mentioning personal attributes of a candidate similarly 
contaminates an ad, whether it be religion, age, a hobby, or otherwise.  
Finally, an ad which uses a visual image to imply any of the above 
should likewise be regulated. 
Before proceeding to develop a standard, it should be remembered 
that a corporation always has a PAC option available.143  If a corporation 
wishes to forgo this option, it can also use mixed advocacy by avoiding 
any reference to a candidate.  If it feels the necessity to mention a 
candidate, it can do so only to identify him as the elected representative, 
provide his contact information, and encourage listeners to contact him.  
But it cannot, whether directly or indirectly, allude to the candidate’s 
position on an issue or anything else about the candidate.  In effect, the 
corporation can attack the candidate’s policy without a viewer 
necessarily knowing that it is the candidate’s policy, and because the 
viewer does not necessarily know the candidate’s position, the ad cannot 
reasonably be deemed to promote, attack, support, or oppose the 
candidate.  After thoroughly examining when a so-called issue ad crosses 
the line, the trick becomes articulating a standard that protects pure issue 
advocacy, but regulates the functional equivalent of express advocacy 
while avoiding constitutional vagueness and overbreadth concerns. 
3. The Means to an End: A Standard That Protects Pure Issue 
Advocacy and Only Pure Issue Advocacy 
After establishing that only pure issue advocacy should be fully 
protected from regulation and clearly defining its bounds, and 
establishing a clear line to determine when an ad becomes the functional 
                                                     
 143. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 204 (2003).  See also Hasen, supra note 4, at 1070–71. 
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equivalent of express advocacy by promoting, attacking, supporting, or 
opposing a candidate, the task becomes developing a standard to meet 
the end goal.  Fortunately, several sources provide guidance: the BCRA’s 
primary and fallback definitions of electioneering communication, the 
WRTL II district court’s five-part test, and the WRTL II principal 
opinion’s test and corresponding analysis by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Scalia. 
Perhaps the best starting point is the WRTL II principal opinion, 
which sets guidelines for a proper standard to use in as-applied 
challenges to BCRA § 203.  The Chief Justice declared that any test 
must be objective, focusing on the substance of the communication 
rather than amorphous considerations of intent and effect.  It must 
entail minimal if any discovery, to allow parties to resolve disputes 
quickly without chilling speech through the threat of burdensome 
litigation.  And it must eschew “the open-ended rough-and-tumble of 
factors,” which “invites complex argument in a trial court and a 
virtually inevitable appeal.”144 
Applying these criteria, the standard developed herein looks promising.  
Under the standard, the intent of the corporation in airing an ad is 
irrelevant, and the effect of all ads which do not meet the protected class 
of pure issue advocacy necessarily affect the listeners such that they are 
the functional equivalent of express advocacy.145  Additionally, the 
standard requires minimal, if any, discovery; analysis is restricted to the 
objective content of the ad.  Finally, the standard does not use open-
ended factors like the WRTL II district court’s test below.146 
Before developing a standard, it is also helpful to examine where 
other standards went awry.  The BCRA’s primary definition of 
“electioneering communication” is perhaps the easiest example.147  To 
avoid vagueness concerns, it made no attempt to evaluate the content of 
the ad; rather, it restricted every ad that met the definition.148  As 
examined earlier, it was thus overbroad because some ads which met the 
definition were nevertheless purely issue ads.149  While Buckley’s magic 
words test is likewise clear and easy to apply, it is equally problematic 
because it lets ads escape regulation that quite clearly engage in 
                                                     
 144. Id. at 469 (citations omitted). 
 145. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 146. See infra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 148. See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 149. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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candidate advocacy, although under the guise of an issue.  Thus, any 
effective standard must balance constitutional concerns with practical 
application. 
The WRTL II principal opinion’s test moves in the correct direction: 
“a court should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation 
other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.”150  
However, it fails to provide any guiding principles for determining 
“reasonableness.”  The wording is also problematic because an ad should 
be regulated if it has any reasonable interpretation as an appeal to vote 
for or against a candidate, thereby crossing the line into mixed advocacy, 
rather than escaping regulation by creating other reasonable 
interpretations.151 
As Justice Scalia accurately determined, the five-factor test 
developed by the district court in WRTL II raised enough vagueness 
concerns that it was unacceptable to adopt.152  However, analysis of the 
factors helps improve the standard here.  To determine whether an ad 
was express advocacy or its functional equivalent, the district court 
looked within the four corners of the ad to examine whether it: 
(1) describes a legislative issue that is either currently the subject of 
legislative scrutiny or likely to be the subject of such scrutiny in the 
near future; (2) refers to the prior voting record or current position of 
the named candidate on the issue described; (3) exhorts the listener to 
do anything other than contact the candidate about the described issue; 
(4) promotes, attacks, supports, or opposes the named candidate; and 
(5) refers to the upcoming election, candidacy, and/or political party of 
the candidate.153 
The first factor should not be considered because it is irrelevant to 
whether an ad engages in pure issue advocacy.  The second factor, as 
explored earlier, is helpful in determining when a so-called issue ad 
crosses the line into the functional equivalent of express advocacy.154  
Factor three is problematic because a pure issue ad can genuinely exhort 
the viewer to do something other than contact the candidate.  For 
example, encouraging a listener to pursue a website link to learn more 
about the issue should be permissible.  Of course, in referring to the link, 
                                                     
 150. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 469–70 (2007). 
 151. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 152. See WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 492 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 153. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 466 F. Supp. 2d 195, 207 (D.D.C. 2006). 
 154. See supra Part III.C.2. 
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the ad cannot allude to the candidate or his position on the issue.  The 
fourth and fifth factors help to determine how an ad may attempt to 
allude to a candidate’s position or personal attributes, as analyzed 
earlier.155 
While the BCRA’s primary definition of electioneering 
communication may fail amid overbreadth concerns, the fallback 
definition presents a workable standard to avoid both vagueness and 
overbreadth concerns: 
“[E]lectioneering communication” means any broadcast, cable, or 
satellite communication which promotes or supports a candidate for 
[federal] office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office 
(regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote 
for or against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible 
meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific 
candidate.156 
To avoid vagueness concerns, as identified by Justice Scalia, however, it 
may need clearer guidelines.157  Additionally, as with the WRTL II 
principal opinion’s test, the key is not whether an ad has any plausible 
meaning other than “as an exhortation to vote for or against a candidate,” 
but whether it has any reasonable interpretation to invite a voter to factor 
it into his decision.158 
Synthesizing the analysis conducted throughout this Comment, a 
standard can now be developed that should avoid vagueness and 
overbreadth constitutional concerns, regulate the functional equivalent of 
express advocacy (or mixed ads), and protect pure issue advocacy.  A 
broadcast advertisement should be prohibited if it: (1) refers to a clearly 
identifiable federal candidate, whether by name, visual image, or 
otherwise; and (2) promotes, attacks, supports, or opposes the identified 
candidate (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates 
a vote for or against the candidate) by alluding to the position of the 
candidate on any issue or to the personal attributes of the candidate.  
Using this standard, in the context of the analysis provided throughout 
this Comment, may sufficiently appease both sides of the debate (at least 
partially) by alleviating First Amendment concerns and protecting pure 
                                                     
 155. See supra Part III.C.2. 
 156. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 201(f)(3)(A)(ii), 116 
Stat. 81, 89 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(ii)). 
 157. See WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 493 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 158. See supra Part III.B.1. 
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issue advocacy, while also implementing the will of Congress to 
eradicate sham issue advocacy. 
4. Justifying “Electioneering Communication” in the Disclosure 
Context 
The BCRA uses the same definition of “electioneering 
communication” for expanding disclosure requirements in BCRA § 201 
as it does for extending the prohibition on corporate spending in BCRA 
§ 203.159  While the constitutionality of the term as used in BCRA § 203 
appears in jeopardy, this Comment asserts that additional governmental 
interests justify its use in the disclosure context. 
Citizens United challenged the BCRA disclosure provisions as 
unconstitutional intrusions that deny the anonymity of donors and require 
the administrative costs of collecting and reporting the information.160  
However, as the district court explained, “the Supreme Court has written 
approvingly of disclosure provisions triggered by political speech even 
though the speech itself was constitutionally protected under the First 
Amendment.”161 
At least three governmental interests, as identified in Buckley, justify 
the use of the BCRA’s broad electioneering communication standard in 
the disclosure context.  First, preventing corruption and the appearance 
thereof justifies the broad disclosure requirements in BCRA § 201.162  
Second, providing the electorate with information justifies the 
requirements.163  With the disclosed information, voters can identify the 
source of advertising money to better evaluate the content of the ad.164  
Additionally, 
[i]t allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more 
precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and 
campaign speeches.  The sources of a candidate’s financial support also 
alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be  
 
                                                     
 159. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act §§ 201(f)(3), 203(c) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 
434(f)(3), 441b(c)). 
 160. Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 280 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 161. Id. at 281 (citing FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 259–62 (1986) (striking 
down a prohibition and declaring that the newly permitted speech was nonetheless subject to the 
disclosure requirements)). 
 162. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976). 
 163. See id. at 66–67. 
 164. See id. 
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responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in 
office.165 
Third, the disclosure requirements can be justified as necessary for 
collecting data to enforce other substantive provisions of the BCRA.166 
While public disclosure may deter some individuals who might 
otherwise contribute, these competing interests should nevertheless 
justify the reporting requirements, as the Court overwhelmingly held in 
McConnell.167  As the Court explained, the broader disclosure 
requirements of BCRA § 201 require “‘organizations to reveal their 
identities so that the public is able to identify the source of the funding 
behind broadcast advertisements influencing certain elections.’”168  
Narrowing the disclosure requirements would decrease the ability of 
citizens to assess the credibility of advertisements and allow 
organizations to run their so-called issue ads while “hiding behind 
dubious and misleading names.”169  Moreover, “disclosure requirements 
are constitutional because they ‘do not prevent anyone from 
speaking.’”170 
In summary, while WRTL II narrowed the scope of what could be 
regulated as an electioneering communication and Citizens United may 
continue deregulation, it does not necessarily follow that the term should 
likewise be narrowed in the disclosure context.171  Rather, the interests 
identified above should justify broad use of the term for disclosure. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the Court considers Citizens United, it is helpful to analyze how 
the standard developed in this Comment would affect the ads in both 
WRTL II and Citizens United.  Applying the proposed standard, it would 
reach the same result as the WRTL II Court in permitting Wisconsin 
Right to Life, Inc., to air all three ads.  Although all three ads mention a 
                                                     
 165. Id. at 67. 
 166. See id. at 67–68 (stating “disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering the 
data necessary to detect violations of [] contribution limitations”). 
 167. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201–02 (2003). 
 168. Id. at 196 (quoting the district court’s opinion). 
 169. See id. at 197 (quoting the district court’s opinion); see also id. at 128, 128 n.23 (illustrating 
various misleading names). 
 170. Id. at 201. 
 171. See also Briffault, supra note 8, at 131–33 (stating “it is quite possible that the Constitution 
will be held to permit one application of ‘electioneering communication’ for one set of regulations, 
but a different application of the very same term for a different set of regulations”). 
0.6.0_SAMSEL FINAL 11/6/2009  1:40:44 PM 
2009] PEERING INTO THE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW CRYSTAL BALL 243 
federal candidate, they do not allude to the candidate’s position on an 
issue or his attributes.172  Rather, they merely urge the listener to contact 
the candidate and encourage him to act in a certain manner, 
notwithstanding that listeners may already know his position on the 
issue.173  As explored earlier, these ads meet the criteria of pure issue ads 
and should be protected from regulation. 
Applying this standard in Citizens United, the Court would reach the 
same conclusion as the district court that all three ads should be 
prohibited.  The ads “Wait” and “Pants” allude to the personal attributes 
of the candidate and do not even mention, let alone discuss, a public 
issue.174  The ad “Questions” alludes to both the candidate’s personal 
attributes (“Who is Hillary Clinton?”; “[s]he’s continually trying to 
redefine herself”; and “Hillary’s got an agenda”) and her position on an 
issue (the form of government that is appropriate for America: “Hillary is 
the closest thing we have in America to a European socialist”).175 
By returning to many of the principles of the McConnell decision 
and regulating sham issue advocacy, the proposed standard would likely 
garner the support of all three remaining Justices of the WRTL II dissent.  
Additionally, although Justice Sotomayor has yet to write an opinion on 
this subject, many believe she will also champion deference to Congress 
in this area.176  By avoiding a query into the intent and effect of the ad, 
and eschewing open-ended factors, the standard could also gain the 
endorsement of Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Alito.  Even Justices 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, despite their well-known tendencies to 
vote against such regulations, may be sufficiently appeased if the criteria 
developed in the standard and corresponding analysis is clear enough to 
avoid a chilling effect on the freedom of speech and permit “uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open” discussion of public issues.177 
In any event, the standard attempts to offer a common sense solution 
that protects that which truly should not be regulated: pure issue 
advocacy.  If the Court seeks to protect all so-called issue advocacy—
both sham and genuine—perhaps the proposed standard and 
corresponding analysis will assist in the writing of future legislation.  
However, if five Justices seek to protect the virtues of pure, genuine 
                                                     
 172. See FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL II), 551 U.S. 449, 458–59 (2007) (providing 
transcripts of the ads “Wedding,” “Loan,” and “Waiting”). 
 173. See id. 
 174. See Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 nn.2–3 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 175. See id. at 276 n.4. 
 176. See Liptak, supra note 6. 
 177. See WRTL II, 551 U.S. at 467. 
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issue advocacy, while ensuring that corporations and unions play by a 
fair set of rules, then the proposed standard should effectively implement 
the fallback definition as used in BCRA § 203 to accomplish the goals of 
Congress.  Should the Court strike down the prohibitions in BCRA 
§ 203, it should nevertheless uphold increased disclosure requirements to 
permit Americans to more accurately assess the credibility of the 
countless ads that air shortly before elections. 
In closing, the attitude of the American people in the 2008 elections 
suggests that the concerns about corruption identified over a century ago 
have not subsided.  In selecting the major presidential nominees, then-
Senator Barack Obama and Senator John McCain, voters picked two 
candidates who championed the limitation of special interests, including 
corporate money, in elections and the political process generally.  
Moreover, voters nationwide expressed a genuine interest in public 
issues and substance, while attacks on candidates, including negative or 
misleading advertising, were generally disfavored by the public.  As 
campaign finance law continues to evolve, this Comment should provide 
helpful guidance for Congress and the Court to improve the rules under 
which individuals, corporations, and unions may engage in political and 
electoral advocacy by implementing the will of the American people and 
closing the loophole for sham issue advocacy, while also protecting 
fundamental First Amendment rights and pure issue advocacy. 
